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Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct?*
Duc Duy Nguyen, Jens Hagendorff and Arman Eshraghi
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that
both board monitoring and advising are effective in preventing misconduct by
banks. While better monitoring by boards prevents all categories of misconduct, bet-
ter advising prevents misconduct of a technical nature. Board monitoring increases
the likelihood that misconduct is detected, increases the penalties imposed on the
CEO, and alleviates shareholder wealth losses following the detection of misconduct
by regulators. Our article offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to
prevent bank misconduct.
JEL classification: G20, G30, K20
1. Introduction
The reputation of banks for professional and ethical conduct is in sharp decline. Over
recent years, regulators have taken record numbers of enforcement actions against banks to
require them to take corrective measures against misconduct. Among the banks engulfed in
misconduct cases are various high-profile institutions. For instance, JPMorgan has faced
several enforcement actions related to credit card fraud, money laundering, and internal
accounting controls over the past few years.1 Misconduct cases are costly to bank investors
with the fines imposed often outweighed by substantial reputational losses for offending
banks. There are also concerns that repeated instances of misconduct erode public confi-
dence in the safety and soundness of the banking sector. What banks can do to prevent
misconduct is therefore an important question. Arguably, a bank’s board of directors, in its
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capacity to monitor and advise the CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Adams and Ferreira,
2007), should play a key role in the implementation and oversight of controls to mitigate
the risk of misconduct.2 The purpose of this article is to test this assertion. Specifically, we
examine whether the two key functions of bank boards, monitoring and advising, are ef-
fective in preventing misconduct by banks. We use regulatory enforcement actions against
banks to identify banks that engage in misconduct.
In some ways, the recent surge in bank misconduct cases is surprising. One explanation
for misconduct holds that when a CEO has too much authority within the firm, misconduct
is but one potential outcome (Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015). However, by most accounts,
oversight of CEO decision-making has improved markedly in recent years. Data from
Riskmetrics show that eight out of ten members of US bank boards are classified as inde-
pendent in 2012, up from around half in 2000. With increasing levels of independence, one
would expect bank boards to be more effective in preventing misconduct. However, far
from a declining trend, the number of enforcement actions has increased from 5 to 28 over
the same time period.
The rise in bank misconduct cases under increasingly more independent boards is con-
sistent with the view that true board independence is difficult to achieve (e.g., Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan, 2014). Board independence can be
undermined if CEOs exert intangible influence over those charged with monitoring them.
One way in which a CEO could yield intangible influence is by capturing the board through
director appointments (Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015). Since the CEO is typically involved in
the process of recommending directors to the board, directors appointed during the tenure
of the current CEO have an incentive to return the favor (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014;
Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015). Even independent directors may reciprocate the CEO’s re-
quests and agree to side with the CEO to support, engage in, or conceal wrongdoing.
Following this line of argument, only directors appointed before the current CEO’s tenure
are free from this type of intangible influence and are therefore capable of objectively moni-
toring the CEO. In this article, we measure the quality of board monitoring using the frac-
tion of directors who are appointed before the current CEO takes office (Monitoring
Quality).
In addition to monitoring, boards also advise the CEO. Advice is critical because CEOs
may not always possess the knowledge and skills required to make decisions that lower in-
stances of wrongdoing. Since the banking sector is complex and skill-intensive (Philippon
and Reshef, 2012), bank CEOs may be prone to missteps in the absence of technical expert-
ise. Therefore, boards with the capability to advise effectively could assist CEOs in making
better decisions and thus play a crucial role in reducing instances of bank misconduct. We
proxy for the quality of board advice using the connections that a director has with dir-
ectors at other firms at any given time (Advising Quality). We focus on director connections
because connections arise when a director has qualities that make them valuable to many
firms (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2012). Demand for director services arises from a dir-
ector’s ability to provide useful advice, information, or contacts. Furthermore, connected
2 Regulators increasingly see boards as key to shaping a bank’s risk culture with a view to prevent-
ing misconduct. Recent regulatory guidelines issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (2014) establish “heighted expectations” of the role of the board in ensuring that banks
operate in a safe and sound manner. Similar expectations of the role of bank boards are expressed
by the Financial Stability Board (2014).
2 D. D. Nguyen et al.
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directors have better access to information which would allow them to offer higher-quality
advice to the CEO.
To identify bank misconduct, we employ a unique dataset of regulatory enforcement ac-
tions issued by the three US supervisory bodies (the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC)) against banks that engage in unsafe, unsound, and illegal banking prac-
tices which violate laws. One concern with our analysis is that we can only observe detected
misconduct (once an enforcement action has been issued), but not the population of all
committed cases of misconduct. That is, even in the absence of enforcement actions, a bank
may still have engaged in undetected misconduct. To address this problem of partial
observability, we follow Wang (2013) and Wang, Winton, and Yu (2010) to employ a bi-
variate probit model that disentangles committing misconduct from the detection of mis-
conduct conditional upon misconduct having occurred.
We find that a bank in which Monitoring Quality is high (all directors have been ap-
pointed before the CEO takes office) has a 27% lower probability of committing miscon-
duct and a 35% higher probability of detection (conditional upon misconduct having
occurred) than a bank where all directors have been appointed under the current CEO.
Further, a one-standard deviation increase in Advising Quality reduces the likelihood that
misconduct is committed by 11% and increases the likelihood of detection by 7%. Our re-
sults are robust to two-stage instrumental variable (IV) analysis that circumvents endogene-
ity concerns by exploiting the role of the local labor market in supplying directors to a
bank. Specifically, we use the distance from a bank’s headquarters to the nearest airport
and the population of the county where a bank is headquartered as sources of exogenous
variation in our measures of board monitoring and advice. In brief, we argue that banks in
remote locations will see higher director turnover and struggle to recruit directors of high
advising capability. Further, in all specifications, we control for the proportion of independ-
ent directors and the number of directors with financial expertise. We find that these trad-
itional measures of board monitoring and advising have little or no power to prevent bank
misconduct.
We are able to rule out alternative economic interpretations of our results. First, one
may argue that our measure of board monitoring quality captures the effect of CEO tenure.
We address this by constructing Residual Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regres-
sion of Monitoring Quality on CEO tenure. Our results continue to hold when using re-
sidual monitoring, which removes any correlation between Monitoring Quality and CEO
tenure. Second, our monitoring measure may capture director experience as longer-tenured
directors are less likely to have been appointed by the current CEO. As with CEO tenure,
we construct Residual Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regression of Monitoring
Quality on average board tenure. Our results remain robust to using this alternative meas-
ure of monitoring quality. Third, our monitoring measure is robust to controlling for dir-
ector’s career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), board busyness (Fich and Shivdasani,
2006), and for the quality of board advising. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our
measure of board advising quality is distinct from monitoring quality, as demonstrated at
various points throughout this study.
How do board monitoring and advising prevent bank misconduct? We study two chan-
nels that help explain the results. First, many enforcement actions are issued when bank
fundamentals indicate increased bank risk. Our results show that better monitoring and
advising prevent enforcement actions because these boards are associated with higher bank
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capital cushions, lower portfolio risk, and fewer nonperforming loans. Second, CEOs will
be deterred from committing wrongdoing if they know ex ante that a board will penalize
them for instances of misconduct. We find that boards that are not captured by the CEO
are more willing to impose heavier penalties on the CEO following detected misconduct.
That is, after misconduct is detected, better Monitoring Quality is associated with a larger
reduction in (i) the level of CEO pay, (ii) the level of CEO pay relative to the other top ex-
ecutives at the same bank (the CEO pay slice), and (iii) the value of CEO risk-taking incen-
tives.3 In contrast, Advising Quality does not affect CEO discipline, consistent with our
argument that Advising Quality is distinct from and unrelated to Monitoring Quality.
Finally, we examine whether the stock market reaction to bank misconduct is affected
by our measures of board quality. We find a positive relation between the announcement
returns and the board quality, implying that effective boards are associated with less severe
fraud. Thus, effective boards not only reduce the likelihood of wrongdoing, but they also
alleviate shareholder wealth losses upon announcements of wrongdoing.
This article makes several important contributions. First, our work is related to the de-
bate on governance and risk-taking in the banking industry (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012;
Adams and Ragunathan, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton, Taillard, and
Williamson, 2014). We contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical work
that studies the effectiveness of bank boards in preventing enforcement actions in the bank-
ing sector. Relative to other bank risk measures studied in the literature, enforcement ac-
tions provide a suitable identification of the effectiveness of internal governance. This is
because enforcement actions provide an unambiguous external indicator of undesirable
conduct in the industry. Further, since regulators determine enforcement, the degree of en-
forcement varies exogenously across banks. Additionally, our empirical approach allows us
to elicit the specific mechanisms through which corporate governance affects misconduct
tendency in banking.
Second, our article contributes to the literature on the determinants and economics of
corporate misconduct. Previous work has linked misconduct to a lack of monitoring by the
board (Beasley, 1996; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala,
2012; Hegde and Zhou, 2014; Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015), outside investors (Wang,
Winton, and Yu, 2010) or various other parties (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2010; Kedia
and Rajgopal, 2011). We contribute to this literature by identifying the role of advising in
explaining misconduct. We find that while monitoring is required to deter all sorts of mis-
conduct, advising plays a clear role in preventing misconduct of a more technical nature.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the role and design of corporate boards (e.g.,
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2012; Field, Lowry,
and Mkrtchyan, 2013; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; Minton, Taillard, and
Williamson, 2014). The key question in this literature is whether boards matter for firm
outcomes, and if they do, which particular board functions matter. We present the first em-
pirical study that simultaneously considers the effects of board monitoring and advising.
Our results on how board monitoring and advising jointly and differentially affect miscon-
duct are new to the literature.
3 The finding of a reduced CEO pay slice is of particular significance because it indicates that, by
disciplining CEOs relative to other bank executives, boards hold CEOs at least in part responsible
for misconduct.
4 D. D. Nguyen et al.
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2. Research Design
2.1 Hypothesis Development
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) posit that directors monitor and
advise the CEO to help align the interests between managers and shareholders and to maxi-
mize shareholder value. Since corporate misconduct can potentially destroy shareholder
value on a large scale (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008a), we conjecture that an effective
board of directors, in its capacity to monitor and advise the CEO, should also play a key
role in mitigating the risk of misconduct.
2.1.a. Board monitoring quality and bank misconduct
It is well-established that in the absence of tight monitoring from the board, CEOs may
have incentives to commit wrongdoing to conceal private benefits (Jensen and Meckling
1976; Stein, 1989; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). Such benefits could involve higher
compensation or non-financial benefits such as greater publicity or empire building. Thus,
a board of directors that is independent from the CEO is needed to monitor and discipline
the CEO to curb managerial misbehavior (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Beasley,
1996).
We hypothesize that boards that are not psychologically captured by the CEO are more
willing to monitor the CEO and that this will prevent misconduct. Our hypothesis is
grounded in social influence theory, which posits that individuals rely on principles of reci-
procity, a nearly universal code of moral conduct, when making decisions (Gouldner,
1960). The theory suggests that most people exhibit a psychological aversion to over-bene-
fiting or under-benefiting from social relationships (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This implies
that when employees believe they receive help in their appointments to a position of corpor-
ate influence, they will be motivated to return the favor to avoid the psychological distress
created by over-benefiting from a relationship.
As the CEO is typically involved in appointing and recommending directors to the
board, directors appointed by the CEO tend to feel indebted to her and thus have a nat-
ural tendency to return the favor (Landier et al., 2013; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014;
Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015). Consistent with this, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) spe-
cify in their model of CEO bargaining with the board that directors develop a natural
aversion to monitoring because the opportunity cost of director’s time can be high.
Consequently, the reciprocity fostered through appointment decisions helps directors to
justify their aversion to monitoring (see also, e.g. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014). This
creates an environment conducive to misconduct, makes detection of misconduct diffi-
cult, and reduces a CEO’s expected costs of committing misconduct. We therefore predict
that directors appointed before the current CEO are psychologically independent and in a
position to objectively monitor the CEO in a way that prevents wrongdoing. We call
the fraction of board directors appointed before the current CEO Monitoring Quality.
We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Monitoring Quality reduces the likelihood of bank misconduct.
2.1.b. Board advising quality and bank misconduct
Our second hypothesis relates board advising to bank misconduct. While early studies sug-
gest that boards monitor and give advice to the CEO (e.g., Mace, 1971), the focus of much
subsequent study has been on the monitoring role of the board (see Coles, Daniel, and
Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct? 5
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Naveen, 2014; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Weisbach, 1988).4 While Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen (2012) offer one of the first studies into the value of board advice by showing that
complex firms benefit from greater advice, more recent studies emphasize the role of board
advice for firms with minimal experience in public markets (Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan,
2013) and firms operating in innovative industries (Dass et al., 2014).
We hypothesize that better board advice prevents corporate misconduct. This is because
some CEOs may lack the expertise to make certain informed decisions and misconduct
cases may occur when CEOs are unaware of the (il)legality of a certain activity (Khanna,
Kim, and Lu, 2015). In banks, some CEOs may lack the technical expertise to effectively
oversee regulatory provisioning and reserve requirements—and breaches of either could
result in regulatory enforcement actions. We, therefore, argue that a board with a higher
capability to give advice to the CEO will facilitate more informed decision-making and pre-
vent incidences of misconduct.
We use director connections as an indicator of board advising. Fama and Jensen (1983)
suggest that connections signal director quality because in a competitive labor market only
high-quality directors hold multiple board appointments. Brickley, Coles, and Linck
(1998), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and others show that high-
quality directors serve on a greater number of boards. In addition, better-connected dir-
ectors are likely to have had experience with a variety of issues that firms face and can lever
their network to access better information (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen, 2012; Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013). Hence, better-connected
directors should be better advisors to the CEO and provide the information, perspectives,
and technical expertise to the CEO to help avoid wrongdoing. We define Advising Quality
as the total number of directors to whom board members on the board are collectively con-
nected, scaled by board size. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Advising Quality reduces the likelihood of bank misconduct
2.2 Sample Construction
We gather data on regulatory enforcement actions issued by the three main US banking
supervisory authorities (FDIC, FRB, and OCC) for the period 2000–13 from SNL
Financial.5 Our sample encompasses all severe enforcement actions, including (i) formal
agreements, (ii) cease and desist orders, and (iii) prompt corrective actions.6
4 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) acknowledge that “one limitation of our model is that it focuses
solely on the monitoring role of boards. The institutional literature emphasizes that boards also
play important roles providing information and advice to management” (p. 112).
5 Enforcement is a key tool that regulators use to ensure that banks maintain safe and sound practi-
ces (Delis and Staikouras, 2011). Typically, regulators conduct on-site examinations to ensure that
bank operations are consistent with sound banking practices. When on-site examinations reveal
unsound or illegal banking practices, regulators will make an informal enquiry to the bank manage-
ment. This gives the bank the opportunity to justify their practices. The regulator will only issue an
enforcement action when there is substantial evidence of misconduct. Therefore, one advantage
of using regulatory enforcement actions to identify banks that engage in misconduct is that there
is a very low chance of misdetection and thus a low chance of misidentifying banks engaged in
misconduct.
6 Formal (written) agreements are agreements between the bank and the regulator that set out
details on how to correct conditions that provide the basis for the agreement. Cease and desist
6 D. D. Nguyen et al.
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In the next step, we obtain all banks with accounting data from commercial banks and
bank holding company data (FFIEC 031/041 and FR Y-9C). To allow for a lag structure in
our dataset, our sample period is from 1999 to 2012. We then obtain market data from the
Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) and corporate governance data from the
BoardEx database and match them with our Call Reports sample.
We then match the name, city, and state of each bank that received enforcement actions
to our panel dataset. This results in a matched sample of 311 enforcement actions. We then
use Factiva to search for newspaper articles reporting the news of the enforcement action
and screen each to ensure that we have correctly attributed the enforcement action to a par-
ticular bank. If there are multiple enforcement actions relating to a single case of miscon-
duct, we group them together so that only one case is identified. Our final sample contains
4,072 bank-year observations of 533 unique banks and 244 enforcement actions.
Table I provides descriptive statistics on the enforcement action sample. It shows that
enforcement actions were taken against banks in every year with a surge following the
2007 global financial crisis. We demonstrate in the Internet Appendix that the results we re-
port are not dependent on the time period analyzed in this article and equally hold before
2007. Table I also shows that our sample is very comprehensive. The sample contains
Table I. Time distribution of banks receiving enforcement actions
This table reports the number of regulatory enforcement actions in our sample over the period
of 2000–13. We also display the number of enforcement actions in our sample in terms of all en-
forcement actions issued against listed US banks and the total assets of banks receiving en-
forcement actions in our sample as a percentage of the total assets of all listed US banks that
receive enforcement actions each year.
Year No. of enforcement
actions in our sample
% All enforcement actions
against listed banks
% Total assets of listed banks
with enforcement actions
2000 5 55.56 98.48
2001 5 41.67 84.34
2002 3 37.50 65.24
2003 7 70.00 96.61
2004 12 80.00 99.01
2005 5 50.00 92.77
2006 6 66.67 99.24
2007 2 50.00 99.67
2008 10 62.50 98.62
2009 48 82.76 93.49
2010 59 88.06 95.18
2011 39 90.70 99.60
2012 28 90.32 99.85
2013 15 83.33 99.82
Total 244 78.71 94.42
orders prohibit the bank from engaging in certain banking activities. They also require the bank to
take corrective actions to improve on areas that provide the basis for the order. Prompt corrective
actions are imposed on undercapitalized banks. They require the bank to restore adequate levels
of capital and demand submission of a capital restoration plan within a predetermined period.
Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct? 7
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nearly 80% of all enforcement actions (nearly 95% by bank size) issued against the listed
US banks during our sampling period.
2.3 Empirical Design
Empirical research on corporate misconduct faces an inherent challenge, namely that
misconduct is not observed until it has been detected. This means the outcome we ob-
serve is the product of two processes: the commission of misconduct and the detection of
misconduct. As long as detection is not perfect, we do not observe every instance of
misconduct that has been committed. To address this partial observability problem, we
follow Wang (2013) and Wang, Winton, and Yu (2010) and use the bivariate probit
model. The theoretical foundation of this model is drawn from Becker’s (1968) economic
approach to crime. It can be implied from the model that an individual’s probability
of committing fraud increases with the expected payoffs and decreases with its ex-
pected cost (from getting detected and penalized). Thus, the probability committing
misconduct is determined by two sets of variables. The first set is derived from the
expected benefit of committing fraud. The second set of variables is related to the ex-
pected cost of committing fraud, which essentially depends on the probability of
detection.
In addition, there are factors that are related to both the probability to commit miscon-
duct and to detect misconduct, for example, a board of directors that is not willing to moni-
tor the CEO, and therefore should be included in both equations. However, there are
factors that affect the likelihood that misconduct is detected but not a bank’s incentives to
commit wrongdoing. Likewise, there are factors that incentivize misconduct but do not
affect the likelihood that misconduct is detected. The bivariate probit model relies on this
intuition to separate fraud detection from commission processes. Let Mit and Dit represent
whether bank i commits wrongdoing in year t and whether the misconduct is detected,
respectively:
Mit ¼ XM;it bM þ lit (1)
Dit ¼ XD;it bD þ it (2)
XM,it is a vector of variables that explain firm i’s incentives to commit misconduct in
year t, and XD,it is a vector of variables that explain firm i’s likelihood of getting caught. mit
and it are zero-mean disturbances with a bivariate normal distribution.
We denote Mit¼ 1 if Mit*>0 and Mit¼ 0 otherwise. We denote Dit¼1 if Dit*> 0, and
Dit¼0 otherwise. We do not directly observe the realizations of Mit and Dit. However, we
can observe the following: Zit¼MitDit where Zit¼1 if bank i engages in misconduct and
this is detected, and Zit¼ 0 if bank i does not commit wrongdoing or commits wrongdoing
but this has not been detected.
Let U denote the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. q is the
correlation between mit and it from (1) and (2). Then:
PðZit ¼ 1Þ ¼ PðMitDit ¼ 1Þ ¼ PðMit ¼ 1; Dit ¼ 1Þ ¼ UðXM;it bM; XD;it bD; qÞ; (3)
PðZit ¼ 0Þ ¼ PðMitDit ¼ 0Þ ¼ PðMit ¼ 0;Dit ¼ 0Þ þ PðMit ¼ 1;Dit ¼ 0Þ
¼ 1  UðXM;itbM;XD;itbD; qÞ
(4)
8 D. D. Nguyen et al.
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Thus, the log likelihood for the model is:
LðbM;bD; qÞ ¼
X
log P Zit ¼ 1ð Þð Þ þ
X
log P Zit ¼ 0ð Þð Þ (5)
The bivariate model can be estimated using the maximum-likelihood method.
According to Poirier (1980), an important feature of this approach is that XM,it and XD,it
do not contain the same set of variables such that there is at least one vector that has one or
more variables absent in the other vector (see also Wang (2013), Wang, Winton, and Yu
(2010)). We detail the variables included in both vectors in Section 2.4.b.
2.4 Variables
2.4.a. Board quality: monitoring and advising
Monitoring quality. We capture board monitoring quality using the number of board mem-
bers appointed before the current CEO takes office. We refer to such members as “non-
captured” board members.7 We define the variable as:
Monitoring Quality ¼ non-captured board members
Board size 1 (6)
The denominator is the total number of directors sitting on the board less the CEO as
she always sits on the board in our sample. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher
values indicating a board that is not captured by the CEO and thus is more willing to
independently monitor the CEO. The average Monitoring Quality in our sample is
0.54. Thus, in our sample, half of the board is not captured by the CEO. We use
BoardEx to construct Monitoring Quality. BoardEx provides biographic data of more
than 60,000 unique directors serving at over 70,000 private, public, and not-for-profit
companies.
For robustness, we also construct the alternative measure Residual Monitoring
Quality, which is defined as the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on
CEO tenure. This variable will remove the positive correlation between CEO tenure and
Monitoring Quality. Thus, it isolates the board monitoring effect from the effect of CEO
tenure.
Advising quality. We use the number of directors to whom existing board members of a
given bank are connected to proxy for the ability of the board to advise the CEO.
Following Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2012), we define the variable as:
Advising Quality ¼ #directors to whom board members are connected
Board size
(7)
For each board member of a given bank, we count the number of directors in other firms
that this member is connected to by serving as codirectors. We then sum across all board
members of this bank and then divide this sum by the size of the board to obtain Advising
Quality. The average Advising Quality in our sample is 1.81. The correlation between
7 To construct this variable, we compare the start of the employment date of the board member and
date the CEO takes office. When the CEO leaves and then gets reappointed, we do not reset tenure
to zero but add on the predeparture tenure.
Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct? 9
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Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality is 0.01 confirming that the two are distinct meas-
ures that proxy for different board functions.8
2.4.b. Control variables
Estimating the bivariate model requires two sets of control variables, one set designed to
explain the commission of misconduct and the other for the detection of misconduct. The
variables are chosen based on the existing theoretical and empirical work in the corporate
fraud literature (Wang, Winton, and Yu, 2010; Wang, 2013; Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015).
Commission of misconduct regressions. Our baseline specification for the latent equation
for banks committing misconduct is as follows:
Mit ¼ XM ;it bM þXMD ;itcM þ lit (8)
XM,it contains a set of variables that previous studies have shown to influence a bank’s
incentives to commit wrongdoing but not the likelihood that the wrongdoing is detected.
XMD,it contains a set of factors that affect the bank’s incentives to commit wrongdoing and
also the likelihood of detection.
XM,it includes the bank’s profitability, leverage, and investor beliefs about industry pro-
spects. CEOs of poorly performing or financially distressed banks could be more likely to
commit wrongdoing to inflate earnings. We control for bank profitability using the ratio of
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (ROA) and leverage using the ratio
of total liabilities to total assets. In addition, Wang, Winton, and Yu (2010) show that mis-
conduct is related to investor beliefs about industry prospects and find a nonlinear relation
with industry charter value. Hence, we include Industry charter value and (Industry charter
value)2 in the misconduct commission equation. Industry charter value is measured as the
median charter value in a given year.
XMD,it contains other bank-level measures such as size, risk, growth prospects, board-
level monitoring proxies, and CEO characteristics. We control for bank size using the nat-
ural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Furthermore, Povel, Singh, and Winton
(2007) argue that CEOs of high-growth firms that exhibit a downturn are more likely to
commit wrongdoing. Thus, we control for the bank’s charter value using the ratio of mar-
ket value of equity divided by the book value of equity (Charter value) and the percentage
of change in bank assets over the prior year (Asset growth). The corporate fraud literature
also suggests that a firm’s risk could be related to a firm’s tendency to commit wrongdoing.
Thus, we control for a bank’s portfolio risk using the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total
assets.
8 However, one could still argue that Advising Quality captures other aspects of board monitoring
that are unrelated to Monitoring Quality. To completely rule out this possibility, we examine the
effects of Advising Quality on CEO turnover and CEO compensation policies, which are part of a
board’s monitoring activities. We find that Advising Quality does not have any measurable effect on
(i) CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, (ii) the level of CEO pay, (iii) the level of CEO pay relative
to other top executives at the same bank (the CEO pay slice), and (iv) the value of CEO risk-taking
incentives. This confirms our argument that Advising Quality is not associated with the monitoring
of the CEO. In contrast, consistent with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014), we find that Monitoring
Quality is significantly related to CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and various CEO compensa-
tion policies. The results are available upon request.
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Board characteristics. We control for various board monitoring proxies, such as the num-
ber of directors on the board (Board size) and the fraction of independent directors (Board
independence). We also include the ratio of independent directors with prior experience as
a CFO or a finance director (Board financial expertise). The monitoring role by independ-
ent directors has been widely documented in the fraud literature (e.g., Beasley, 1996).
Furthermore, directors with relevant expertise could offer timely advice to the CEO and
could therefore play an important advising role (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).
Further, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that another reason for directors’ aver-
sion to monitoring is because their career is tied to the CEO. Hence, we control for dir-
ectors’ career concerns to demonstrate that the results based on our measure of monitoring
quality are not driven by directors’ career concerns. We proxy for career concerns using the
average age of directors on the board (Ln(Board age)) since career concerns should be
stronger when a worker is further away from retirement (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).9
Finally, for better-connected directors to be able to lever their network to access better
information and be better advisors to the CEO, board networks should be “good” in the
sense that they should not involve connections to firms engaged in misconduct. Otherwise,
board connections could be used to foster rather than to prevent misconduct. To control
for the quality of director networks, we compute the aggregate connections that board
members have to firms that were involved in a misconduct case in the past 10 years. We
call the resulting variable Exposure to misconduct.10
CEO characteristics. Our controls for CEO characteristics include the number of years the
CEO has served in this position (Ln(CEO tenure)) and whether the CEO also chairs the
board (CEO is chair). We control for CEO tenure throughout the article to demonstrate
that the results based on our measure of monitoring quality are not driven by CEO tenure.
We control for CEO is chair as CEOs who chair the board may block the information flow
to board members and hence reduce the quality of board oversight (Fama and Jensen,
1983).
CEO pay. A number of papers link fraud to the compensation of executives (e.g., Johnson,
Ryan, and Tian, 2009). CEOs may be incentivized to commit wrongdoing to manipulate
short-term performance to enjoy higher payouts. We control for the bonus component of
CEO pay, measured as CEO bonus divided by total compensation. We also control for the
equity incentives embedded in CEO compensation. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank
risk (vega) measures the changes of CEO wealth to stock return volatility. If misconduct in-
creases equity risk, this means that CEOs with higher vega will have an incentive to engage
in riskier projects, including those involving wrongdoing. In contrast, the sensitivity of
CEO wealth to bank performance (delta) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock price
9 For robustness, we use two alternative measures of career concerns in addition to board age and
report the results in the Internet Appendix.
10 We use a database of accounting fraud cases, namely, the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) to identify misconduct among financials and nonfinancial firms.
The database provides detailed information on more than 1,300 cases of accounting misconduct
involving banks and nonfinancials between 1982 and 2013. In robustness tests (Internet
Appendix), we use cartel cases as an alternative measure of misconduct and report qualitatively
similar results.
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performance. Because delta exposes a CEO’s wealth also to falling stock prices, a higher
delta might discourage CEOs from committing wrongdoing. Since CEOs will be interested
in the relative impact of both vega and delta on their wealth before deciding to commit
wrongdoing, we scale vega by delta (CEO vega/delta).11
Top executive characteristics. Bank wrongdoing could directly relate to a range of observ-
able characteristics of top executives. We compute the fraction of top five executives with a
degree from an Ivy League institution (% Ivy League executives), an MBA degree (% MBA
degree), or military experience (% Military executives). Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala
(2012) show that CEOs attending an Ivy League university are less likely to commit fraud.
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) argue that military-trained CEOs tend to have more con-
servative corporate policies and ethical principles. Hence, we infer from the findings that
military-trained executives are less likely to commit wrongdoing.
Regulators. We control for the main regulator that supervises the bank. We include two
dummies: OCC (equals 1 if the bank is overseen by the OCC) and FRB (equals 1 if the
bank is overseen by the FRB).
Detection of misconduct regressions.
Dit ¼ XMD;itdD þXD;itbD þ it (9)
As illustrated above, the vector XMD,it contains variables that influence both misconduct
commission and detection processes.
However, certain factors trigger the detection of misconduct while unrelated to the
causes of banks committing misconduct. This is true for factors that cannot be anticipated
by the CEO at the time when misconduct is committed. For example, a sudden drop in per-
formance is difficult to predict for CEOs, but this performance drop may trigger additional
regulatory scrutiny of banks and thus contribute to misconduct being detected. We identify
a vector XD,it which includes variables that affect detection but are exogenous to a bank’s
ex ante incentives to commit wrongdoing. Following Wang (2013), we include Abnormal
ROA, Adverse stock return, Abnormal return volatility, and Abnormal stock turnover in
this vector.
To capture Abnormal ROA performance relative to recent past performance, we compute
the residuals (eit) from the following model for each bank: ROA it¼b0þ b1ROAit  1þ
b2ROAit  2þ eit. Adverse stock return is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank’s stock
return is in the bottom 10% of all the bank-year return observations in the CRSP database.
In addition, the bank’s stock return volatility and stock turnover could also trigger detection
by regulators. We measure Abnormal return volatility as the demeaned standard deviation of
daily stock returns in a given year and Abnormal stock turnover as the demeaned daily stock
turnover in a given year.
Finally, we include year dummies in all regression specifications in the article to control
for the general economic environment. Table II provides summary statistics for the vari-
ables that we use in our analysis.
11 We are grateful to Jeffery Coles, Naveen Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen for sharing their data on CEO
equity-based incentives online. Please refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Core and
Guay (2002) for detailed calculation of the variables.
12 D. D. Nguyen et al.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/rof/article-abstract/20/1/1/2461432 by King's C
ollege London user on 13 O
ctober 2018
Table II. Descriptive statistics
Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. For each variable, the p-value of the dif-
ference between banks with misconduct and without misconduct are calculated. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Misconduct?
N Mean Median Std. p.1 p.99 Yes No
Key governance measures
Monitoring quality 4072 0.544 0.545 0.314 0.000 1.000 0.462 0.548***
Advising quality 4072 1.815 0.000 3.802 0.000 18.263 1.788 2.338**
Bank-specific characteristics
ROA (%) 4072 0.580 0.857 1.278 5.226 2.197 0.572 0.639***
Leverage 4072 0.906 0.909 0.029 0.815 0.966 0.918 0.905***
Industry charter value 4072 1.503 1.312 0.613 0.787 2.591 1.169 1.169***
Ln(Assets) 4072 21.692 21.328 1.699 19.090 27.298 22.067 21.673***
Asset growth 4072 0.102 0.066 0.190 0.172 0.789 0.037 0.106***
Portfolio risk 4072 0.728 0.739 0.142 0.314 1.023 0.740 0.727
Charter value 4072 1.503 1.384 0.924 0.139 4.366 1.070 1.526***
Loans 4072 0.666 0.685 0.143 0.135 0.904 0.673 0.666
Nonperforming loans 4072 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.036 0.005 0.002***
Tier-1 capital 4072 0.089 0.086 0.023 0.041 0.161 0.081 0.089
Stock returns 4072 0.010 0.020 0.117 0.361 0.273 0.056 0.013***
Corporate governance measures
Board size 4072 11.598 11.000 3.528 6.000 23.000 11.035 11.626**
Board independence 4072 0.765 0.800 0.138 0.364 0.933 0.772 0.765
Board financial expertise 4072 0.040 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.333 0.050 0.040*
Exposure to misconduct 4072 0.147 0.000 0.569 0.000 3.000 0.172 0.146
Ln (Board age) 4072 4.125 4.126 0.064 3.957 4.288 4.136 4.125**
Institutional ownership 1196 0.243 0.239 0.122 0.017 0.552 0.247 0.242
CEO characteristics and incentives
Ln (CEO tenure) 4072 1.916 1.988 0.793 0.095 3.395 2.053 1.909**
CEO is chair 4072 0.490 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.485 0.490
CEO vega/delta 887 0.389 0.286 0.286 0.000 1.623 0.503 0.381**
CEO bonus/total compensation 1273 0.130 0.035 0.166 0.000 0.623 0.122 0.131
CEO ownership 1273 0.028 0.008 0.069 0.000 0.434 0.050 0.027***
CEO dismissal 4072 0.091 0.000 0.288 0.000 1.000 0.111 0.090
Ln(CEO total pay) 1273 7.740 7.585 1.151 5.757 10.593 7.954 7.725*
CEO pay slice 1196 0.376 0.364 0.109 0.124 0.742 0.376 0.376
CEO vega 887 221.473 53.111 412.213 0.000 1908.120 239.649 220.281
Top-5 characteristics
% Ivy League executives 1196 0.125 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.600 0.135 0.125
% MBA executives 1196 0.294 0.200 0.256 0.000 1.000 0.329 0.292
% Military executives 1196 0.058 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.600 0.044 0.059
Detection of misconduct
Abnormal ROA 3018 0.000 0.217 1.164 4.864 2.302 0.960 0.055***
Adverse stock return 3018 0.045 0.000 0.207 0.000 1.000 0.197 0.037***
Abnormal stock volatility 3018 0.000 0.009 0.063 0.124 0.219 0.043 0.002***
Abnormal stock turnover 3018 0.000 0.024 0.740 1.765 2.484 0.282 0.014***
Instrumental variables
Ln(Distance airport) 4072 2.539 2.485 0.778 0.531 4.329 2.480 2.418
Ln(Population) 4072 0.771 1.000 0.420 0.000 1.000 0.798 0.769
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3. Bank Boards and Bank Misconduct
3.1 Main Results
Table III reports our bivariate probit estimation regression results. Odd-numbered columns
report prediction results for banks committing misconduct [P(M¼ 1)]; even-numbered col-
umns show the prediction results for banks that were detected to have committed miscon-
duct, conditional upon misconduct having been committed [P(D¼1jM¼ 1)].
The coefficients of our key variables of interest, Monitoring Quality and Advising
Quality, are statistically significant. Effective board monitoring and advising are associated
with fewer cases of committed misconduct and more cases of detected misconduct. The re-
sults are economically significant. The estimated coefficient of Monitoring Quality suggests
that a bank with all directors appointed before the CEO taking office (Monitoring
Quality¼ 1) has a 27% lower probability of wrongdoing commission and a 35% higher
probability of detection than a bank with no director appointed before the CEO taking of-
fice (Monitoring Quality¼ 0). A one-standard deviation increase in Advising Quality is
associated with 11% lower probability of wrongdoing and 7% higher probability of
detection.
The control variables have the expected signs. Most interestingly, board independence
does not enter significantly. This indicates that the current standard for director independ-
ence, which mostly focuses on the absence of economic ties between directors and a firm,
fails to prevent misconduct. We also find that banks with greater exposure to firms that
have engaged in misconduct have a higher likelihood of committing misconduct and a
lower likelihood of misconduct detection. This confirms that network quality plays an im-
portant role in preventing misconduct. Further, powerful CEOs, as proxied by CEO is
chair, are less likely to be detected and are associated with a higher probability of commit-
ting misconduct. Surprisingly, we find that younger boards are associated with fewer mis-
conduct cases. This could be because younger boards are more concerned about
reputational damage (and diminished opportunities for new employment) if they gain a
reputation as ineffective monitors.
The variables excluded from the detection equation but included in the commission
equation (Abnormal ROA, Adverse stock return, and Abnormal stock volatility) show the
expected signs and are statistically significant. An F-test of joint significance of Abnormal
ROA, Adverse stock return, Abnormal stock volatility, and Abnormal stock turnover (F-
stats¼ 62.81; Prob>X2¼ 0.000) indicates that they are jointly significant. Likewise, the
variables excluded from the commission equation are also individually and jointly
significant.
Section 6 presents numerous robustness tests which show that our results are robust
using a standard probit regression, the pre-2008 period only, board monitoring and advis-
ing by independent directors only, as well as various alternative tests.
3.2 CEO Characteristics and Bank Misconduct
An alternative explanation for the results we report above could be that CEOs with certain
characteristics, such as greater talent or industry experience, may be more attracted to
work for more connected boards. Thus, the lower misconduct likelihood associated with ef-
fective board advising could be due to CEO characteristics rather than board advising. This
section shows that our main results remain robust to the inclusion of variables that measure
CEO pay, shareholder ownership, education, and military background.
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Table III. Bivariate probit model estimation for board effectiveness and bank misconduct
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising
Quality and the commission of misconduct (M¼ 1), and Columns (2) and (4) report the relations
between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and detection, given misconduct
(D¼ 1jM¼ 1). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period
1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1) P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring quality 1.180*** 2.187**
(3.212) (2.044)
Advising quality 0.131*** 0.087***
(3.839) (3.360)
ROA 0.003 0.203**
(0.058) (2.264)
Leverage 9.440*** 10.789**
(2.925) (2.386)
Industry charter value 4.923*** 10.326***
(3.111) (4.205)
(Industry charter value)2 1.594*** 3.191***
(3.014) (3.650)
Ln(Assets) 0.108 0.873*** 0.234*** 0.097*
(1.254) (3.890) (3.066) (1.815)
Asset growth 0.224 2.528* 0.020 1.555***
(0.347) (1.793) (0.038) (3.917)
Portfolio risk 1.259* 0.321 0.803 0.819
(1.955) (0.208) (0.907) (1.169)
Charter value 0.305*** 0.372 0.354*** 0.044
(2.968) (1.535) (3.679) (0.532)
Loans 1.872** 5.728** 1.016 0.270
(2.255) (2.490) (1.364) (0.408)
Nonperforming loans 10.526 26.039* 18.607 12.635**
(0.976) (1.766) (1.550) (2.479)
Tier-1 capital 2.253 11.234 6.645 0.574
(0.541) (1.075) (1.338) (0.189)
Board size 0.038 0.204*** 0.018 0.031
(1.437) (2.594) (0.310) (1.452)
Board independence 0.241 0.297 1.107 0.360
(0.372) (0.185) (0.643) (0.594)
Board financial expertise 0.900 2.084 0.606 0.025
(1.315) (1.232) (0.685) (0.043)
Exposure to misconduct 0.391** 1.209*** 0.318* 0.347***
(2.115) (3.453) (1.851) (3.200)
Ln (Board age) 3.243*** 2.876 0.215 2.255**
(2.951) (0.849) (0.140) (2.504)
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.133 0.335 0.414*** 0.048
(1.023) (1.048) (4.067) (0.619)
(continued)
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The first two columns of Table IV report the estimates between CEO pay and miscon-
duct commission and detection, respectively. We find that CEO Bonus/total compensation
and CEO vega/delta are positively related to the probability that misconduct is committed.
The positive link between CEO bonus payment and wrongdoing is consistent with our ar-
gument that CEOs commit wrongdoing in order to boost stock prices and enjoy higher
payouts.
Columns (3) and (4) control for the personal characteristics of top executives. We find
that executives attending elite universities (% Ivy League Executives) are less likely to com-
mit wrongdoing which is consistent with these executives having greater skills and abilities.
Alternatively, they could have greater concerns for their career and reputation
(Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala, 2012). Executives with an MBA degree or military
training have no effect on wrongdoing.
3.3 Results for Different Classes of Enforcement Actions
While we find that effective boards reduce wrongdoing, it is unclear whether this reduction
holds for different types of misconduct. For instance, effective board advising could be par-
ticularly relevant in reducing technical types of misconduct where advising via the board
will be particularly important to inform CEO decision-making. To verify this, we classify
enforcement actions according to how technical the underlying violation is. We examine
the newspaper coverage and the websites of bank supervisory authorities to gather informa-
tion on the exact violation(s) that have given rise to an enforcement action. We classify mis-
conduct cases as technical if the enforcement action has been caused by violations of
requirements concerning capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, lending, provisions,
and reserves. We classify misconduct cases as nontechnical if the enforcement actions are
related to failures of a bank’s internal control and audit systems, risk management systems,
and anti-money laundering systems. Nontechnical misconduct cases also include breaches
of the requirements concerning the competency of the senior management team and the
board of directors as well as violations of various laws such as consumer compliance
Table III. Continued
P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1) P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO is chair 0.510*** 1.610** 0.910*** 0.314***
(2.942) (2.546) (3.729) (2.709)
Abnormal ROA 0.574*** 0.359***
(2.925) (5.499)
Adverse stock return 0.584 0.559***
(1.189) (3.062)
Abnormal stock volatility 3.544* 3.761***
(1.725) (3.644)
Abnormal stock turnover 0.128 0.091
(0.790) (1.474)
Observations 3004 3004 3004 3004
Prob>X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood 497 497 491 491
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programs, Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA).12 Panel A of Table V shows the summary statistics of the two enforcement action
types.
Consistent with our expectation, Panel B of Table V shows that Advising Quality re-
duces technical types of misconduct (such as violations of capital requirements or substand-
ard asset quality) but has no measurable effect on nontechnical types of misconduct. This
reaffirms that our measure of board advising is different from board monitoring. Thus, con-
sistent with previous literature (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2012; Field, Lowry, and
Table IV. Board effectiveness and bank misconduct: CEO characteristics
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated relations between CEO characteristics and the com-
mission of misconduct (M¼ 1), and Columns (2) and (4) report the relations between CEO char-
acteristics and detection, given misconduct (D¼ 1jM¼ 1). Monitoring Quality and Advising
Quality and detection, given misconduct (D¼ 1jM¼ 1). Standard errors are clustered at the
bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in
Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1) P(M¼ 1) P(D¼ 1jM¼ 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring quality 3.453*** 2.120** 1.480*** 2.331**
(4.050) (2.236) (3.035) (2.291)
Advising quality 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.128*** 0.762***
(3.315) (3.948) (3.921) (4.574)
CEO vega/delta 1.426*** 0.412
(4.039) (1.587)
CEO bonus/total compensation 2.162** 1.343
(2.051) (1.470)
CEO ownership 1.656 4.805***
(0.774) (2.956)
% Ivy League executives 1.570*** 10.033***
(2.781) (5.350)
% MBA executives 0.257 1.245*
(0.728) (1.645)
% Military executives 0.182 2.122
(0.212) (1.602)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 722 722 945 945
Log likelihood 117 117 176 176
Prob>X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 While we cannot rule out that certain technical and nontechnical types of misconduct could be
functional to each other, we can demonstrate that these two types of misconduct capture largely
unrelated types of behavior. We find the correlation between the two types to be 0.02 (not statisti-
cally significant). To further ensure that our results are not driven by cases in which both types of
enforcement actions occur, we exclude banks that receive both types of enforcement actions dur-
ing our sample period. The results of this untabulated test do not alter our main findings.
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Mkrtchyan, 2013), our results indicate that board advising matters more when the demand
for director advice is high. On the other hand, Monitoring Quality matters to both types of
misconduct.
We show that board advising matters most to misconduct of a technical nature. We take
the analysis further by narrowing down the definition of the Advising Quality proxy and
reestimate this relation. Our baseline definition of Advising Quality is the number of dir-
ectors to whom the directors on the board are collectively connected, scaled by the size of
the board. This assumes that every director has equal knowledge regardless of the industry
in which the director is working. However, it is possible that a director serving on the board
of a firm in an industry related to banking has better access to information and will be in a
better position to offer relevant advice to the CEO. Furthermore, the director is likely to en-
counter similar technical issues confronting the board, such as setting the level of capital re-
quirements. Hence, we construct a new measure of board advising: Industry Connections.
This is defined as the connections that arise only from serving on boards in the following
industries: insurance, investment companies, life assurance, and private equity.13 Our se-
cond measure of advising is Large Firm Connections, which is based on the connections
arising from serving on boards of large firms, where large means total assets above the sam-
ple median. Directors who serve on the board of a large firm have to deal with a wide range
of issues facing the board and therefore could be able to offer better advice to the CEO
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2012).
Panel C reports the estimated relations between alternative proxies of board advising
and technical-related misconduct. For comparison purposes, columns (1) and (2) report our
baseline results using the original definition of Advising Quality while Columns (3) and (4)
report the results using Industry Connections and (5) and (6) report Large Firm
Connections. All coefficients are statistically significant. Most interestingly, Columns (1)
and (3) reveal that the magnitude of Industry Connections is twice as large as that of our
baseline measure (the difference is statistically significant). The results indicate that dir-
ectors whose connections arise from firms in a related industry are able to offer high-quality
advice to the CEO, providing further support to our hypothesis that board advising matters
to misconduct.
Overall, our findings demonstrate that boards with higher advising capacity could assist
the CEO in making more accurate and better-informed decisions, thereby decreasing in-
stances of wrongdoing.
3.4 Endogeneity of Board Measures
Identifying causality between our two board measures and bank misconduct poses some
challenges. In particular, banks of a certain board composition could either attract or select
CEOs who are more likely to commit misconduct. It is possible, for instance, that CEOs in-
tent on committing misconduct choose to work for banks with ineffective boards. Further,
while we control for a range of board and CEO characteristics, it is still possible that unob-
servable firm characteristics affect both director selection and the occurrence of misconduct
at the same time. For instance, a bank’s corporate culture may be such that it makes mis-
conduct more likely and may also attract a certain type of CEO who is more likely to en-
gage in misconduct.
13 BoardEx has a variable called “Sector” which classifies firms into different industry sectors. The
analysis shown in this test relies on the BoardEx definition of industry sector.
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To circumvent these endogeneity concerns, we exploit the role of the local labor market
in supplying directors to a bank. Specifically, we construct two IVs that are related to
Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality but are not related to misconduct. The first in-
strument is the distance from a bank’s headquarters to the nearest airport (Ln(Distance
Airport)). Geographic coordinates are obtained from the US Census file. The second instru-
ment is the population of the county of the bank’s headquarters (Ln(Population)). County
information is obtained through COMPUSTAT and the population information comes
from the US Census Bureau.
Both instruments are related to Monitoring Quality because they both affect the rate of
director turnover. Arguably, directors are likely to eschew remotely located banks, that is,
banks headquartered further away from an airport, in favor of more conveniently located
banks. We would therefore expect higher director turnover in remote bank locations as dir-
ectors leave these banks for more conveniently located institutions. Higher director turn-
over results in more director appointments and thus in lower Monitoring Quality at
remotely located banks. Equally, both instruments affect Advising Quality because banks
in locations with better access to an airport and banks located in more populous areas
should have access to a larger labor market. Since the supply of qualified directors is limited
and their recruitment is time-consuming (Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis, 2013), more
convenient bank locations will make it more likely that banks are able to recruit qualified
directors with high advising capabilities. Advising Quality should thus be higher for more
conveniently located banks.
Importantly, neither the distance to the next airport nor the population of the county of
a bank’s headquarters should be related to bank misconduct other than through the effect
the instruments have on board composition. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) puts in place the basis for a consistent intensity of en-
forcement across the USA by requiring that each bank be examined by federal regulators as
least once every 12 months.14 In addition, our data confirm that the enforcement intensity
does not vary between urban and rural areas.15
The first-stage estimation results are reported in Table VI, columns (1), (2), (5), and (6).
Specifications (1) and (5) are for the commission equation while specifications (2) and (6)
are for the detection equation. We run two first-stage regressions for Monitoring Quality
and Advising Quality. As expected, Monitoring Quality decreases with the distance from a
bank’s headquarters to the nearest airport and Advising Quality increases with the county’s
population.
The second-stage regression results are reported in specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8).
The coefficients on our IV estimates are statistically significant and larger than those of
14 Some banks may qualify for a lower supervision frequency of 18 months if it is safe and sound
and its total assets are below $500 million. This should not be a concern because there are less
than 10% of banks in our sample falls into this category.
15 As in Degryse and Ongena (2005), we define counties as urban if the population is more than
250,000 and as rural otherwise. We calculate enforcement intensity as the number of enforcement
actions issued divided by the number of banks. The enforcement intensity is 0.38 and 0.33 for
urban and rural areas, respectively and this difference is not statistically significant at customary
levels. Under the assumption that misconduct is not location-related other than through the effect
the instruments have on board composition, we interpret this as showing that enforcement inten-
sity is uniform across the country.
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OLS estimates. A potential explanation for this difference is that not accounting for endo-
geneity would bias the coefficients of Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality in OLS to-
ward zero (Theil, 1971). This problem can be mitigated by the instrumental variable
approach. Overall, we interpret these results as showing that our measures of board quality
are causally related to misconduct in banking.
4. How Do Boards Reduce Enforcement Actions?
In this section, we explore two specific channels through which boards can reduce
bank misconduct cases. We examine whether boards that are more effective monitors
and advisors could be associated with (i) lower bank risk or (ii) improved managerial
discipline.
4.1 Reduction in Bank Risk
Many cases of technical misconduct are issued when bank fundamentals indicate increased
risk. Thus, effective boards could reduce technical misconduct by reducing a bank’s risk
measures. We analyze three risk indicators: Tier-1 capital, portfolio risk and the fraction of
nonperforming loans. Tier-1 capital is a core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a
regulatory point of view. Commercial banks exert discretion over the level of capital as
long as it is above the minimum capital. In addition, we also examine portfolio risk and the
fraction of nonperforming loans as both are important causes of enforcement actions.
Table VII reports the relation between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and meas-
ures of risk.
After controlling for bank and other board characteristics, both Monitoring
Quality and Advising Quality are positively related to Tier-1 capital. A one-standard
deviation increase in the percentage of noncaptured board members and connected board
members is associated with a 21-basis point and an 12-basis point improvement in
the bank’s Tier-1 capital, respectively. In addition, we find a negative relation
between Monitoring Quality and the bank’s portfolio risk (as measured by the proportion
of risk-weighted assets on a bank’s balance sheet) and the fraction of nonperforming
loans. Overall, the results in Table VII indicate that both board monitoring and board
advising are associated with safer banks and, hence, reduce the instances of technical
misconduct.
4.2 Managerial Discipline
CEOs are likely to consider the personal costs of committing wrongdoing before they en-
gage in it (Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 2015). There are several ways in which the CEOs could
be disciplined following the detection of misconduct. CEOs may lose their reputation and
their job, and in some cases may face criminal charges (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008b).
Among these possible consequences, some are determined by the courts, some by the labor
market, and some by the board.
One of the key monitoring functions of the board is to evaluate and discipline the CEO
(Mace, 1971). We would expect that boards that are not captured by the CEO will impose
heavier penalties on the CEO if wrongdoing is detected. We consider four ways in which
boards could discipline CEOs: (i) dismissal, (ii) reductions in pay, (iii) reductions in pay
relative to other top executives, and (iv) reductions in contractual risk-taking incentives
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Table VII. Board quality and bank’s accounting measures of risk
This table estimates the impact of board monitoring and advising quality on various measures
of risk. The dependent variables are Tier-1 capital ratio, bank’s portfolio risk and the fraction of
nonperforming loans. All models include year dummies and bank-fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all vari-
ables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Tier-1 capital Portfolio risk Nonperforming loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monitoring quality 0.006** 0.029*** 0.004***
(2.263) (3.082) (4.025)
Advising quality 0.0004** 0.0002 0.000
(2.019) (0.146) (0.401)
ROA 0.000 0.000 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.818) (0.883) (5.906) (5.922) (3.748) (2.091)
Leverage 0.340*** 0.341*** 0.725*** 0.720*** 0.021** 0.021*
(11.920) (11.840) (2.860) (2.832) (2.051) (1.877)
Ln(Assets) 0.002 0.003* 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001
(1.480) (1.671) (0.398) (0.360) (1.122) (0.809)
Asset growth 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(3.086) (3.202) (0.267) (0.246) (0.523) (0.574)
Portfolio risk 0.026** 0.026** 0.004 0.005
(2.374) (2.321) (1.636) (0.741)
Charter value 0.001* 0.001* 0.005 0.005 0.000* 0.000
(1.713) (1.710) (1.251) (1.240) (1.745) (1.264)
Loans 0.007 0.007 0.520*** 0.522*** 0.007** 0.007
(0.739) (0.803) (9.800) (9.855) (2.456) (1.071)
Nonperforming loans 0.084* 0.081* 0.577** 0.599*  
(1.959) (1.838) (1.961) (1.956)  
Tier-1 capital – – 0.659* 0.642* 0.001 0.003
– (1.950) (1.895) (0.104) (0.211)
Board size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.658) (1.262) (0.307) (0.993) (3.205) (2.956)
Board independence 0.008* 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.005** 0.004
(1.755) (1.419) (0.414) (0.132) (2.556) (1.564)
Board financial expertise 0.014** 0.013** 0.029 0.032 0.004 0.004
(2.075) (1.983) (0.733) (0.799) (1.228) (0.556)
Exposure to misconduct 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.280) (0.571) (0.138) (0.075) (1.260) (1.329)
Ln (Board age) 0.007 0.015 0.037 0.073* 0.001 0.006
(0.590) (1.531) (0.889) (1.808) (0.155) (0.908)
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.000 0.002*** 0.006* 0.003 0.001*** 0.000
(0.122) (2.847) (1.732) (1.357) (3.244) (0.072)
CEO is chair 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.257) (0.230) (0.018) (0.013) (4.058) (2.350)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3519 3519 3519 3519 3519 3519
R2 0.672 0.671 0.821 0.820 0.524 0.522
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(CEO vega).16 These variables are measured 1 year after the enforcement action
takes place.
Table VIII reports the regressions of our board measures on measures of CEO discipline.
Misconductt-1 is equal to 1 if wrongdoing is detected during the previous year. Misconduct
relates detected wrongdoing to the CEO’s penalties via an interaction with Monitoring
Quality. Therefore, the coefficient of the interaction term measures the penalties the CEO
has to bear after wrongdoing is detected and when board monitoring is high.
Panel A of Table VIII displays our key estimation results. Odd-numbered columns omit
the interaction terms while even-numbered columns display the full set of variables. As
shown in the odd-numbered columns, Misconduct is not significant in any specification.
On average, a regulatory enforcement action does not lead to CEOs being disciplined.
However, the interaction term between Misconduct and Monitoring Quality indicates that
following misconduct under higher board monitoring quality, CEOs are disciplined in the
following ways: CEOs receive (i) a larger pay cut, (ii) a reduced pay slice relative to other
top executives at the same bank, and (iii) lower contractual risk-taking incentives (CEO
vega). It is interesting to note that our results on pay slice show that the reduction in CEO
pay following misconduct is not due to executive pay having been reduced for all execu-
tives, but that CEO pay has been reduced relative to other executives. Evidently, boards
view the CEO as the key person holding responsibility for misconduct and therefore reduce
the CEO salary relative to the salaries of other executives.
Panel B of Table VIII displays the results of tests that interact Misconduct with Advising
Quality. Advising Quality should not have an effect on how CEOs get disciplined following
misconduct. Consistent with this, none of the interaction terms enter the regression signifi-
cantly. This validates our interpretation of Advising Quality capturing the ability of the
board to give advice rather than to monitor the CEO.
Our results have two key implications. First, noncaptured directors discipline the CEO
after wrongdoing is detected, thus increasing the CEO’s costs of wrongdoing. This could
act as an ex ante deterrent to the CEO to engage in wrongdoing and could explain why our
earlier analysis shows that effective board monitoring reduces the probability that banks
engage in misconduct. Second, in the absence of a board that engages in effective monitor-
ing, regulatory enforcement actions have little impact on CEOs being disciplined. These re-
sults add novel insights to the CEO’s disciplinary mechanisms in the banking sector
(Schaeck et al., 2012). In banks, not only shareholders but regulators are also involved in
monitoring and therefore play a role in the CEO’s disciplinary process. Consistent with
this, our results indicate that regulatory action alone does not discipline bank CEOs, but a
combination of the two—effective board monitoring and enforcement action—can create
the desired effects.
5. Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses?
In the previous sections, we show how effective boards reduce the likelihood of bank mis-
conduct. We now test whether effective boards also reduce the severity of misconduct.
Consistent with the prior literature, we capture the severity of misconduct using the
16 We are only interested in CEO vega but not CEO delta because vega gives the CEO a clear incen-
tive to commit wrongdoing while delta has an ambiguous effect on wrongdoing. Thus, boards
would be interested in modifying the vega component following wrongdoing discovery.
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Table VIII. Board quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct
This table estimates the impact of board monitoring and advising quality on a CEO’s penalties
following an enforcement action. The dependent variables are an indicator of CEO dismissal,
Ln(CEO total pay), the level of CEO pay relative to other top executives at the same bank (CEO
pay slice) and CEO pay-risk sensitivity (vega). All models include year dummies and bank-fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period
1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Monitoring quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct
CEO dismissal CEO pay CEO pay slice CEO vega
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monitoring quality 0.095 0.478** 0.117** 0.113*
* Misconduct (0.611) (2.335) (2.437) (1.798)
Misconduct 0.014 0.035 0.061 0.308** 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.048
(0.275) (0.401) (0.634) (1.998) (0.699) (0.479) (0.267) (0.725)
Monitoring quality 0.067 0.075 0.004 0.037 0.005 0.078* 0.036 0.046
(0.877) (0.995) (0.021) (0.200) (0.171) (1.797) (0.562) (0.817)
ROA 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
(1.528) (1.526) (0.934) (0.930) (0.123) (0.129) (0.172) (0.255)
Leverage 0.832 0.818 0.304** 0.311** 0.072 0.055 0.466 0.460
(1.489) (1.466) (2.417) (2.456) (0.427) (0.327) (1.045) (1.024)
Ln(Assets) 0.054 0.055 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.031
(0.995) (1.021) (0.103) (0.182) (0.504) (0.544)
Charter value 0.058** 0.059** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.007 0.009 0.050 0.052
(2.116) (2.112) (2.857) (3.006) (0.939) (1.101) (1.397) (1.436)
Board size 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.543) (1.532) (0.179) (0.200) (0.620) (0.579) (0.206) (0.149)
Board independence 0.319* 0.319* 0.706** 0.708** 0.003 0.003 0.100 0.098
(1.959) (1.967) (2.250) (2.247) (0.061) (0.059) (0.502) (0.493)
Board financial expertise 0.062 0.061 0.272 0.278 0.054 0.056 0.261 0.259
(0.266) (0.260) (0.594) (0.600) (0.606) (0.621) (1.302) (1.293)
Exposure to misconduct 0.368 0.360 1.095 1.132 0.235 0.245 0.140 0.143
(0.737) (0.722) (1.118) (1.135) (1.280) (1.304) (0.575) (0.583)
Ln (Board age) 0.005 0.005 0.034 0.032 0.010 0.010 0.050* 0.050*
(0.202) (0.221) (0.909) (0.854) (1.652) (1.593) (1.721) (1.705)
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.005* 0.005*
(4.387) (4.359) (0.325) (0.369) (0.240) (0.295) (1.667) (1.699)
CEO is chair 0.022 0.024 0.087 0.080 0.005 0.006 –
(0.447) (0.470) (1.005) (0.933) (0.334) (0.446) –
CEO ownership 0.642*** 0.649*** 0.332 0.292 0.200 0.191 0.028 0.029
(2.630) (2.645) (0.481) (0.429) (1.469) (1.425) (0.638) (0.674)
Stock returns 0.025 0.029 0.154 0.596 0.002 0.007 0.030 0.026
(0.145) (0.167) (0.658) (0.780) (0.050) (0.178) (0.276) (0.238)
Institutional ownership 0.195 0.188 0.816* 0.777 0.093 0.084 0.079 0.074
(0.960) (0.929) (1.709) (1.623) (1.142) (1.044) (0.441) (0.413)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 944 944 944 944 944 944 738 738
R2 0.247 0.248 0.855 0.856 0.465 0.472 0.786 0.787
(continued)
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abnormal stock price reaction to the announcement of misconduct (e.g., Cumming, Leung,
and Rui, 2015).
We expect to find a positive relationship between the announcement returns and
measures of board monitoring and advising. Since high-quality boards are more effective
at preventing misconduct, detected cases of misconduct are likely to be less severe.
Assuming that the wrongdoing that is detected in t is likely to have been committed in
t 1, we expect lagged board variables to be linked with higher announcement returns.17
Further, effective boards are more likely to take corrective action, such as disciplining the
CEO and “fixing” the bank after wrongdoing has been detected. Thus, investors may be
more positive about misconduct when the current board exhibits high monitoring or
advising quality. Thus, we also include contemporaneous measures of monitoring and
advising in our analysis.
We use event study methodology to test these hypotheses. To find the announcement
date, we search newspapers using the Factiva database and define the event day as the ear-
liest trading day when the news of the enforcement action is made public. We drop several
observations where there are missing stock returns or when other major corporate news is
released on the same day. This yields a sample of 206 announcements. We then estimate a
market model using a value-weighted CRSP index as a market index from 46 to 146 days
before the announcement of an enforcement action. We construct cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs) as the sum of the prediction errors of the market model.
The average CARs over a 3-day [1, þ1] event window is 3.50% (significant differ-
ence at the 1% level). This shows that regulatory enforcement actions hurt shareholder
wealth. The dependent variables are CARs of 3-day window [1, þ1]. Table IX displays
our regression results. Columns (1) and (2) show that the announcement returns are posi-
tively related to measures of Monitoring Quality when wrongdoing is committed (t1)
as well as when it is detected (t). The coefficients are also economically significant. CARs
are on average 6% higher when the board has all directors appointed before the CEO’s
tenure than when none are appointed before the current CEO’s tenure. Thus, effective
board monitoring reduces the severity of the misconduct. Further, investors expect an ef-
fective board to take action to help the bank recover from the misconduct as shown by a
significant coefficient on contemporaneous measures of Monitoring Quality. This lends
Table VIII. Continued
Panel B: Advising Quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct
CEO dismissal CEO pay CEO pay slice CEO vega
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advising Quality 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.014
*Misconduct (1.607) (0.038) (0.455) (1.084)
Misconduct 0.056 0.051 0.006 0.045
(0.841) (0.404) (0.211) (0.932)
Advising Quality 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.013
(0.854) (0.569) (0.219) (1.231)
17 Our results are robust to alternative time gaps between the commission and the detection of mis-
conduct. We find qualitatively identical results if the gap is 2 or 3 years.
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Table IX. Do effective boards alleviate shareholder wealth losses when misconduct becomes
public?
This table reports the multivariate regression analyses of stock market reactions to the an-
nouncements of banks receiving an enforcement action. The dependent variables of all models
are CARs for a 3-day window [1, þ1] (%). All models include year dummies. Definitions of all
variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * in-
dicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
CARs [1, þ1] %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring Qualityt 2 1 6.237**
(2.127)
Monitoring Qualityt 5.927**
(2.507)
Advising Qualityt 2 1 0.134
(0.786)
Advising Qualityt 0.145
(0.752)
ROA 0.626* 0.491 0.595 0.621*
(1.713) (1.365) (1.639) (1.701)
Leverage 10.245 15.323 10.124 13.629
(0.330) (0.502) (0.328) (0.435)
Ln(Assets) 0.109 0.061 0.097 0.130
(0.260) (0.146) (0.233) (0.251)
Asset growth 3.055 2.795 3.341 2.746
(0.530) (0.493) (0.577) (0.477)
Portfolio risk 0.734 1.313 0.678 0.819
(0.083) (0.151) (0.077) (0.093)
Charter value 0.363 0.492 0.280 0.340
(0.563) (0.775) (0.434) (0.530)
Loans 4.683 3.531 3.890 4.137
(0.587) (0.450) (0.488) (0.520)
Nonperforming loans 6.167 14.100 4.250 8.097
(0.175) (0.406) (0.121) (0.229)
Tier-1 capital 0.997 6.661 2.642 4.411
(0.030) (0.204) (0.079) (0.131)
Board size 0.458** 0.379* 0.449** 0.447**
(2.113) (1.759) (2.051) (2.037)
Board independence 5.802 3.956 5.092 5.574
(1.112) (0.766) (0.975) (1.067)
Board financial expertise 2.837 3.257 2.416 2.414
(0.455) (0.531) (0.388) (0.387)
Exposure to misconduct 0.670 0.398 0.033 0.734
(0.655) (0.395) (0.025) (0.719)
Ln (Board age) 10.751 10.903 12.208 12.077
(1.123) (1.159) (1.268) (1.256)
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.419 0.993 0.079 0.078
(0.651) (1.175) (1.045) (1.031)
CEO is chair 0.785 0.302 1.025 1.001
(0.560) (0.217) (0.722) (0.705)
Constant 41.393 46.007 47.340 48.467
(0.780) (0.884) (0.896) (0.915)
Observations 206 206 206 206
R2 0.216 0.225 0.197 0.193
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support to our prior finding that following enforcement action, a board with effective
monitoring capability will discipline the CEO. Finally, Columns (3) and (4) show that
Advising Quality does not enter the regression significantly.
6. Internet Appendix: Robustness Tests on the Relation between
Board Effectiveness and Bank Misconduct
In this section, we test the robustness of our key results using alternative definitions of our
board measures. The results are included in an internet appendix to this article.
6.1 Is Monitoring Quality Driven by CEO Tenure?
Monitoring Quality correlates with CEO tenure as longer-tenured CEOs will have been
able to appoint a larger fraction of directors. Thus, our measure of monitoring quality may
capture the effects associated with long CEO tenure instead of effective board monitoring.
We show that our results are not affected by CEO tenure as follows.
First, we control for CEO tenure in all specifications in the analysis above. Second,
we compute Residual Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regression of Monitoring
Quality on CEO tenure. This variable is free of any positive correlation between CEO tenure
and Monitoring Quality. As indicated in the Internet Appendix AI, our results are robust
using our modified measure of Monitoring Quality that strips out the effect of tenure.
6.2 Is Monitoring Quality Driven by Director Experience?
Another possibility is that our Monitoring Quality correlates with director tenure, and thus
reflects the experience of directors. Directors who are not captured by the CEO tend to
have longer board tenure. We use two different approaches to deal with this concern.
First, we control for average board tenure. Second, as with CEO tenure, we estimate
the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on average board tenure. Our results
are robust to using this modified measure of monitoring as indicated in the Internet
Appendix AII.
6.3 Is Monitoring Quality Capturing Director’s Career Concerns?
In the analysis above, we use board age to control for director career concerns. In this sec-
tion, we use two alternative measures of career concerns and show that controlling for these
does not alter our main findings.
First, we include the fraction of board members who are younger than 65 years. Second,
we include the fraction of board members whose current appointment at the bank is their
first and only directorship. These directorships should be particularly valuable to directors
thus raising their career concerns and turning them into more effective monitors. As shown
in the Internet Appendix AIII, Monitoring Quality continues to enter significantly after con-
trolling for these alternative proxies of directors’ career concerns.
6.4 Is Advising Quality Different from Board Busyness?
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define a board to be “busy” if more than half of the outside dir-
ectors on a board hold three or more directorships. While a board does not need to be “busy”
to have high Advising Quality, we could expect a positive correlation between these two meas-
ures. Thus, Advising Quality may capture the effects of a busy board instead of effective
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advising quality. We define Board busyness similar to Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and perform
two tests to show that the effects we obtain for Advising Quality are not driven by Board
busyness.
As shown in the Internet Appendix AIV, Board busyness does not explain bank miscon-
duct. First, we include both Advising Quality and Board busyness in the bivariate probit
model. The coefficients of Board busyness are insignificant in both the commission and the
detection equations while the coefficients of Advising Quality remain significant. Second,
we repeat the analysis by including only Board busyness but not Advising Quality. Again,
none of the coefficients are significant.
6.5 Alternative Measure of the Quality of Director’s Networks
Our article uses accounting fraud data to measure the quality of director networks. For ro-
bustness, we also use an alternative source of fraud data, the Private International Cartels
Data Set (Connor, 2010).18 This dataset includes more than 2,115 companies involving in
price-fixing cartels between 1998 and 2012. As shown in the Internet Appendix AV,
Advising Quality remains significant. Consistent with the argument that the fraudulent cul-
ture can be transmissible, we find that banks with more connections to cartelists are more
likely to commit wrongdoing and are less likely to get detected.
6.6 Using a Standard Probit Model
Our article uses the bivariate probit model to show that effective boards reduce the prob-
ability of the CEO committing misconduct conditional upon detection of misconduct. For
robustness, we also show the results of a simple standard probit model to examine the rela-
tionship between effective boards and the likelihood of a bank receiving an enforcement ac-
tion in the Internet Appendix AVI Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality enter
negatively and are statistically significant indicating that monitoring and advising are asso-
ciated with fewer enforcement actions.
6.7 Alternative Bivariate Probit Model Specification
In our baseline model, we have some excluded instruments in both the commission and the
detection equations. Some studies that use the bivariate model to study fraud have excluded
instruments in one equation, say, fraud detection equation, but not the other (e.g., Khanna,
Kim, and Lu, 2015). To test if our bivariate model is sensitive to the model specification,
we remove ROA, Leverage, and Industry charter value from the fraud commission equa-
tion. The results are in the Internet Appendix AVII.
6.8 Are Our Results Driven by the Post-2007 Period?
Table I shows a surge in the number of enforcement actions issued after the 2007 financial
crisis. This raises concerns that our results could be driven by the 2008 financial crisis. To
address this concern, we split the sample into two groups: before and after the crisis. As
shown in the Internet Appendix AVIII, our results are not driven by the crisis.
6.9 Independent Directors
Our definitions of Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality do not differentiate between
directors who are independent and executives who sit on the board. One may argue that
18 We thank John Connor for generously sharing the cartel data with us.
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our results could be mostly driven by executives on the board who should feel most be-
holden to the CEO. To address this concern, we limit our analysis to independent directors
and calculate the fraction of independent directors who are appointed before the CEO’s
tenure (Monitoring Quality of Independent Directors) and the connections of independent
directors (Advising Quality of Independent Directors).
As shown in the Internet Appendix AIX, we find that all results obtained using independ-
ent directors are similar to those using all board members. This implies that independent dir-
ectors can also be susceptible to monitoring quality and advising quality. Monitoring and
advising quality among independent directors affects the likelihood of misconduct being com-
mitted and detected in the same way as for the complete board. An implication of this finding
is that the share of independent directors that has been extensively studied in the literature as
a key monitoring device does not sufficiently capture a board’s monitoring ability.
7. Conclusions
Trust in the banking sector is vital to the functioning of the financial system and for eco-
nomic activity. Misconduct in banking undermines the general public’s confidence in the
safety and soundness of the banking sector. Thus, studying the determinants of bank mis-
conduct is an important topic of potentially wide implications.
In this study, we focus on two key functions of bank boards, monitoring and advising,
and find that both functions are effective in reducing the probability that banks receive en-
forcement actions from regulators. Further analyses reveal that while board monitoring re-
duces all categories of misconduct, board advising reduces misconduct of a more technical
nature. The results are economically meaningful and robust to two-stage instrumental vari-
able analysis. Overall, we identify three channels through which effective boards deter mis-
conduct: effective boards increase the likelihood that misconduct is detected, they reduce
bank risk and they increase the penalties imposed on the CEO following the discovery of
misconduct. Furthermore, effective boards also mitigate the severity of misconduct.
Our study has important implications for policy makers. The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (2014) in its recent regulatory guidelines establishes “heightened expect-
ations” of the role of bank boards in shaping a bank’s risk culture and in reducing miscon-
duct cases. These views are echoed by the Financial Stability Board (2014) which places
bank boards at the core of effective risk management and emphasizes their responsibility in
monitoring and providing “sage advice” to senior management. The findings we report in
this article confirm that boards play an important role in the risk management of banks and
that the “heightened expectations” of boards in preventing misconduct are justified.
Finally, our artice offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to prevent
misconduct. First, our study shows that in addition to monitoring, directors also give
advice to the CEO and this plays an important role in preventing misconduct. Thus, the
advisory function of boards deserves more attention as part of the governance process.
Second, we show that conventional board measures such as board independence and
financial expertise have no measurable effect on bank misconduct being committed or de-
tected. In contrast, the board metrics we study in this article related to monitoring and
advising are important predictors of misconduct. Overall, our study illustrates that board
governance matters in banking. Our findings demonstrate that governance metrics
revolving around CEO connections warrant more attention from regulators, investors,
and governance activists.
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Appendix I. Definition of variables
Variable Definition Source
Key governance measures
Monitoring Quality The fraction of board members who are appointed
before the CEO takes office
BoardEx
Advising Quality The number of directors to whom board members on
the board are collectively connected, scaled by board
size
BoardEx
Residual Monitoring
Quality
The residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality
on Ln(CEO tenure)
BoardEx
Board-tenure adjusted
monitoring quality
The residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality
on Ln(Board tenure)
BoardEx
Monitoring Quality
of independent
directors
The fraction of independent directors who are
appointed before the current CEO
BoardEx
Advising Quality
of independent
directors
The number of directors to whom independent directors
on the board are collectively connected, scaled by the
total number of independent directors sitting on the
board
BoardEx
Bank-specific characteristics
ROA (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by
book value of total assets (BHCK2170)
CRSP,
FR Y9-C
Leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total
assets
FR Y-9C
Industry charter value The median charter value in a given year FR Y-9C
Ln(Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) FR Y-9C
Asset growth The percentage of change in total assets relative to prior
year
FR Y-9C
Portfolio risk Ratio of risk-weighted assets (BHCKA223) divided by
total assets
FR Y-9C
Charter value Market value of equity divided by book value of equity CRSP,
FR Y9-C
Loans Ratio of total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets FR Y-9C
Nonperforming loans Ratio of loans past due day 90 days or more
(BHCK5525) and nonaccrual loans (BHCK5526)
divided by total assets
FR Y-9C
Tier-1 capital Ratio of Tier-1 capital (BHCK8274) divided by total
assets
FR Y-9C
Stock returns Annual buy-and-hold stock returns CRSP
Corporate governance measures
Board size The number of directors sitting on the board BoardEx
Board independence The fraction of nonexecutive directors on the board BoardEx
Board financial
expertise
The fraction of independent directors with prior
experience working as a CFO or finance director
BoardEx
Exposure to
misconduct
The aggregate connections board members have with
firms that involved in a misconduct case committed
within the past 10 years
AAERs
Exposure to cartel
networks
The aggregate connections board members have with
firms that involved in a price-fixing cartel discovered
within the past 10 years
Private
International
Cartels
(continued)
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Appendix I. Continued
Variable Definition Source
Ln (Board age) Natural logarithm of the average age of board members BoardEx
Ln (Board tenure) Natural logarithm of the average tenure of board
members
BoardEx
Age< 65 years The fraction of board members whose age is below
65 years
BoardEx
First and only
directorship
The fraction of board members whose current
appointment at the bank is their first and only
directorship
BoardEx
Board busyness Dummy equals 1 if the majority of board members hold
three or more directorships and 0 otherwise
BoardEx
Institutional ownership The fraction of shares held by investment companies
and independent investment advisors
Thomson One
Banker
CEO characteristics and incentives
Ln (CEO tenure) Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has
served in this position
BoardEx
CEO is chair Dummy that equals 1 if CEO is also the chairperson BoardEx
CEO bonus/total
compensation
CEO bonus divided by CEO total pay ExecuComp
CEO ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO ExecuComp
CEO dismissal We follow Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) to identify
CEO dismissal. If the press reports the CEO
turnover as “fired”, “forced out”, “dismissed”,
“resigned following a period of bad performance”
or “resigned due to policy differences”
it is classified as forced. We classify all departures of
CEOs who are older than 60 years as
voluntary. We classify departures of CEOs who are
younger than 60 years as “dismissed” if the press
does not report the reason as “poor health”, “death”,
or “acceptance of another position”; or if the article
reports the CEO is retiring, but does not announce
the succession plan at least six months
before the new CEO takes office
Factiva
Ln(CEO total pay) The natural logarithm of CEO total pay ExecuComp
CEO pay slice The fraction of top five executives’ pay captured by
the CEO
ExecuComp
CEO vega Sensitivity of CEO compensation to share price,
expressed in $’1000
ExecuComp
CEO delta Sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return
volatility, expressed in $’1000
ExecuComp
Characteristics of top five executives
% Ivy League
executives
The fraction of top five executives with an Ivy League
education
BoardEx
% MBA executives The fraction of top five executives with an MBA degree BoardEx
% Military executives The fraction of top five executives with prior military
experience
BoardEx
(continued)
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